Keepers of the sacred flame: Patriotism, politics and the Chinese history subject community in Hong Kong by Vickers, E et al.
Title Keepers of the sacred flame: Patriotism, politics and the Chinesehistory subject community in Hong Kong
Author(s) Kan, F; Vickers, E; Morris, P
Citation Cambridge Journal Of Education, 2007, v. 37 n. 2, p. 229-247
Issued Date 2007
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/54291
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Keepers of the Sacred Flame – Patriotism, Politics and the Chinese 
History Subject Community in Hong Kong 
 
*FLORA KAN (Assistant Professor, Faculty of Education, the University of Hong 
Kong) 
EDWARD VICKERS (Lecturer, Institute of Education, University of London) 
PAUL MORRIS (President, Hong Kong Institute of Education) 
 
Abstract: 
 Chinese History (a subject entirely separate and distinct from ‘History’) has long 
been the most politically sensitive subject in Hong Kong’s school curriculum. Previous 
studies have analysed the policies of the colonial and postcolonial governments 
towards this subject. Here, we examine the role played by the Chinese History subject 
community (comprising teachers, academics and officials in the government’s 
educational bureaucracy), and look at the way in which this has operated as an 
autonomous interest group. We conclude that the influence of this subject community 
has been a key factor limiting the extent to which the local educational authorities have 
been able to develop a coherent policy in relation to history education in general, and 
the teaching of national history in particular. Specifically, advocates of the maintenance 
of Chinese History as a separate subject within the school curriculum have been able, 
by associating themselves with the post-1997 agenda of ‘patriotic education’, to 
effectively hoist the local educational bureaucracy with its own petard. 
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Hong Kong’s political transition from British colony (or ‘territory’) to a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been 
marked, in the field of education policy, by a movement from a depoliticized school 
curriculum to one which explicitly espouses Beijing’s agenda of state-centred 
patriotism. In previous studies the present authors have charted this ideological shift, 
analyzing the ways in which it has manifested itself in changes to the curricula for 
History, Chinese History and Civic Education. Hitherto, our principal focus has been on 
the official process of curriculum development, and the political influences that have 
shaped that process (Vickers, 2005; Vickers, Kan and Morris, 2003; Kan and Vickers 
2002; Morris, Kan and Morris, 2000). 
In this article, however, we propose to examine more closely the role played in the 
development of the school curriculum for Chinese History by an autonomous (or 
pseudo-autonomous) subject community. 
Although in the British system, upon which Hong Kong’s system of schooling has 
largely been modeled, autonomous subject associations have often played a prominent 
role in curriculum development (as, for example, was the case with the History 
Association in the debate over National Curriculum History for England), in Hong 
Kong, subject associations have tended to be either weak or non-existent. In the 
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absence of vocal pressure groups representing teachers of particular school subjects, 
the process of developing curricula for these subjects has tended to be overwhelmingly 
dominated by the officials of the Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB, or before 
2002 the Education Department [ED]) and especially the Curriculum Development 
Institute (the CDI) and the Hong Kong Examinations Authority (since 2001 the Hong 
Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority, HKEAA). The outstanding exception 
in this regard have been those associated with the school subject of Chinese History, 
who since at least the mid-1970s have formed a relatively cohesive subject community, 
even though formal subject associations were only established in 1999-2000. 
The term "subject community" is here taken to refer to individuals and groups 
variously associated with the same school subject, who work together to safeguard the 
status of that subject and their own interests as stakeholders. This community usually 
consists of government officials, academics, teachers, and textbook writers who 
operate either as insiders (for example, as curriculum developers) or outsiders (for 
example, as a pressure group) in influencing policy making with respect to their subject. 
Members of the subject community may either organize themselves collectively to 
protect or promote their subject, or may work as individuals voicing their opinions 
through the media.  
According to Bucher and Strauss (1976), the interests that the subject community 
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strives to protect typically include curricular ‘territory’ (in the form of space in school 
timetables), resources, recruitment and training. Some scholars also point out that 
subject communities are seldom homogeneous groupings. Frequently, patterns of 
curriculum development reflect a power struggle between rival members of the subject 
community. For example, Goodson (1987) asserts that: 
The subject community [in the UK] should not be viewed as a homogeneous 
group whose members share similar values and definition of role, common 
interests and identity. Rather the subject community could be seen as comprising a 
range of conflicting groups, segments or factions. (pp. 26-27) 
 
Ball (1985) holds a similar view: 
There are power struggles between groups, coalitions, and segments within the 
subject community each with their own ‘sense of mission’ and differing 
competing vested interests, resources and influences. (pp. 17-18) 
 
In the UK, teachers are recognized as a professional group with a set of 
professional codes governing its membership. This professional community is thus able 
to define the “knowledge” that is considered of most worth to be taught in schools. As 
Esland and Dale (1973) point out: 
Teachers, as spokesmen for subject communities, are involved in an elaborate 
organisation of knowledge. The community has a history, and through it, a body 
of respected knowledge. It has rules for recognising “unwelcome” or “spurious” 
matter, and ways of avoiding cognitive contamination. It will have a philosophy 
and a set of authorities, all of which give strong legitimation to the activities 
which are acceptable to the community. Some members are accredited with the 
power to make “official statements” – for instance, editors of journals, presidents, 
chief examiners and inspectors. These are important as “significant others” who 
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provide models to new or wavering members of appropriate belief and conduct. 
(pp. 70-71) 
Where, as in the UK, all teachers go through a process of formal professional training, 
usually (though not always) in the subject they will go on to teach in school, the 
experience of training also plays a role in initiating the new teacher into the practices 
and beliefs of his or her fellow-teachers. 
In the case of Hong Kong, however, it is still the case that anyone who possesses a 
university degree can become a teacher, so long as they register with and obtain 
approval from the EMB.1 This helps to explain why teachers in Hong Kong tend not to 
be fully recognised as professionals (in the sense that lawyers or doctors are) as they are 
not required to have a minimum level of professional preparation nor become members 
of statutory professional bodies (Morris, 2004). The relatively low status of teachers 
has been a common phenomenon in former British colonies, where education for the 
“natives” has tended to be under-resourced by the colonial authorities, and where 
teachers in most schools have typically been regarded as technicians charged with 
delivering a dry curriculum whose content is determined by high-stakes examinations. 
While the designation “colonial” is deeply problematic as a description of Hong Kong 
during the last quarter-century of British rule, the structural and cultural legacy of 
colonialism has undeniably cast a long shadow over certain aspects of the education 
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system – though, as will become evident below, its influence has often been manifested 
in unexpected ways. 
If the status and influence of schoolteachers in Hong Kong has tended to be low, 
that of the educational bureaucracy, and in particular the subject officers of the EMB 
and the HKEAA2, has been rather high, and bolstered by the security of tenure that 
officials in these posts have generally enjoyed. The stable nature of officialdom 
reinforced the bureaucratic attitude of an avoidance of risk. This bears a direct 
relationship to the relatively small scale of changes made in the Chinese History 
curriculum in the last half century. At Sixth-form level, the setting of syllabuses for the 
‘Higher’ (‘H’ level’) (in 1991 replaced by the AS-level) and the Advanced-level 
examinations provided spheres of influence for academics from the History 
Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Chinese Department of 
the University of Hong Kong respectively. The content of the Higher-level and 
Advanced-level syllabuses was directly linked with the area of expertise of the staff of 
the two universities (Kan, 2002, p. 257).  
The bureaucratic culture, the power of academics in the Sixth Form subject 
committees, and the centralized top-down decision-making process (Morris 1995, 
McClelland 1991) have reinforced the power of subject officers and longstanding 
members of curriculum committees (in the case of Chinese History, senior academics 
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who enjoyed hierarchical superiority over other committee members by virtue of the 
teacher-student relationship), and hence their ability to define “official knowledge” 
within the Chinese History subject. Their role corresponds to that depicted by Young 
(1971): 
Those in positions of power will attempt to define what is to be taken as 
knowledge, how accessible to different groups any knowledge is, and what are the 
accepted relationships between different knowledge areas, and between those 
who have access to them and make them available (p. 52). 
 
Notwithstanding the relatively low status of schoolteachers in Hong Kong, there 
are several teachers’ associations operating which aim to enhance the teaching and 
learning of a specific subject or group of subjects. These include groups such as the 
Science and Maths Education Association and the Economics Education Association. 
In the case of Chinese History, it was not until 2000 that two formal teacher 
associations were set up in response to perceived threats to the interests of the subject. 
Prior to that, there were no organized efforts made to advance those interests, although 
various influential individuals in the Chinese History subject community occasionally 
made their voices heard through the media.  
Before discussing the role of this subject community, however, a word is 
necessary regarding the rather peculiar history of the Chinese History subject itself. The 
school curriculum in Hong Kong features not one but two entirely distinct history 
subjects, since in addition to Chinese History there is a separate ‘History’ subject 
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encompassing not only ‘World History’, but also modern Chinese history and the 
history of Hong Kong. This is thus not simply a division between national and foreign 
history, of a kind found in the school curricula of many countries. Rather, it owes its 
origins to the bilingual nature of the schooling system in colonial Hong Kong, and the 
influence of a deeply-rooted indigenous historiographical tradition which the British 
authorities felt obliged to recognise and incorporate within the school curriculum. Prior 
to the 1950s, Chinese History was taught in Hong Kong using textbooks produced in 
Nationalist China, but following the Communist victory in the Civil War, and the 
divisive ramifications of this for Hong Kong (with different groups there supporting the 
Communists and defeated Nationalists), the government deemed it prudent to 
domesticate and depoliticise the curriculum for the subject. Curriculum development 
was effectively delegated to a group of highly traditionalist exiled scholars and teachers 
(some associated with New Asia College, the kernel of the future Chinese University of 
Hong Kong), and the result was a curriculum culturally conservative, highly moralistic 
and glorifying in China’s ancient heritage, but devoid of any modern content and 
politically neutered. The History subject, meanwhile, was taught in English and, until 
the late 1960s, featured sections focusing on British and Imperial history. After about 
1970, however, British content was dropped, and the subject adopted an increasingly 
modern and contemporary focus. While most schools made the study of both History 
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and Chinese History compulsory up to the end of the junior secondary years (roughly 
age 14-15), from the 1980s onwards the two subjects increasingly found themselves in 
direct competition for curriculum space at both junior and senior levels. The pressure 
was most keenly felt by those involved with the History subject, and this helped to spur 
curriculum developers to look for new ways of maximising their subject’s appeal and 
relevance – a search which ultimately led to the introduction of local history into the 
curriculum in the 1990s. (See Vickers, 2005; Vickers, Kan and Morris, 2003). 
Over the past 50 years, there have been constant disputes within the subject 
community as well as between the subject community and the colonial government 
over aims, content and methods of assessment. During the period of British 
administration, any changes proposed to the curriculum for this subject tended to elicit 
knee-jerk accusations regarding colonialist plots to suppress nationalism and cultural 
identity and /or to prejudice the population against the KMT (Kuo Min Tang 
[Nationalist]), the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) or both. Those who expressed their 
views in the newspapers included academics, schoolteachers and textbook writers. 
They did not organize themselves into teachers’ associations but acted as individuals, 
voicing their opinions in a variety of newspapers of various political hues (both pro- 
and anti-Beijing, or Taipei). Despite their apparently uncoordinated nature, the public 
disputes that occasionally erupted over Chinese History did place considerable pressure 
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on the colonial government, in particular because of the attention that adverse coverage 
tended to attract on the Chinese mainland.  
Since 1997, changes made to the Chinese History curriculum have not only 
provoked more furious disputes, for example, allegations that the curriculum revision 
proposals reflect a neocolonialist plot, but have also prompted more concerted efforts 
on the part of the Chinese History subject community to organize itself. In the present 
article, we will first examine the evolving socio-political context of Hong Kong which 
forms the backdrop to the development of the subject and the evolution of the 
associated subject community. We emphasise that Hong Kong’s Chinese History 
subject community differs significantly from models derived from UK studies, which 
see such communities as typically driven by internal rivalry and power struggles. 
Rather, it has been animated by a firm common belief amongst members of the 
community regarding Chinese History’s central mission of moral and political 
socialisation. We further argue that the reason why key stakeholders have been able to 
exert enormous influence over the subject while at the same time seldom being held 
accountable to any external authority relates to the peculiar political conditions 
prevailing during the period of British rule and the subsequent transition to Chinese 
sovereignty. The government’s own lack of political legitimacy effectively shielded 
this group of people - most notably bureaucrats and academics - from public scrutiny 
10 
and accountability. Our discussion is divided into three periods, corresponding to shifts 
in the wider political context and in the role assumed by the Chinese History subject 
community: the 1950s to 1974, 1974-1997 and 1997-2005.  
GUARDIAN OF CHINESE CULTURE: 1950s –1974 
 In this period, the Chinese History subject community's primary role as a guardian 
of Chinese culture was closely related to the colonial government’s direct intervention 
in education in general and in the area of Chinese Studies in particular. This 
intervention was aimed primarily at eliminating from the school curriculum any 
discussion of China’s contemporary politics. We will first discuss the ways in which 
the colonial government tightened its control of education and Chinese Studies and will 
follow with an analysis of how the Chinese History subject community assumed its role 
in response to the socio-political conditions of the time. 
After the Communist regime was established in China in 1949, the colonial 
government, in an attempt to avoid getting drawn into the struggle between the KMT 
and the CCP, depoliticised the school curriculum and tightened its control of education.  
The Government’s control over subject curricula, and in particular the history 
curriculum was recorded in the 1952 Annual Report: 
History textbooks present the greatest and most urgent problem. Not only are 
nearly all existing Chinese texts [i.e. those issued by publishers associated with 
the Communist or Nationalist parties] unsatisfactory for educational and 
sometimes for political reasons … A further difficulty arises from the 
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predominance of Chinese history, and the neglect of the history of the rest of the 
world, in the history syllabuses followed hitherto by nearly all Chinese schools. It 
is hoped that it will be possible for all secondary schools to follow a course of 
general world history in which the history of China will be given its due part, 
together with a supplementary course of the social and cultural history of the kind 
often given in the present Chinese literature and history lessons. (Annual Report, 
Education Department, 1952, p.56)  
 
Also in 1952, a Chinese Studies Committee was set up with the purpose of 
reviewing the aims of and setting the parameters for the future development of Chinese 
subjects, including Chinese History. It is worth noting here that members of the 
Chinese Studies Committee were mostly from the education sector and they considered 
the aim of teaching Chinese history as  
… to get rid of this [inferiority] complex by reviving what is good in Chinese 
culture, thereby instilling fresh confidence into, and restoring the self-respect of 
her people. This, however, must not be identified with the promotion of vanity 
and anti-foreignism which is to be strongly deprecated. (Report of the Chinese 
Studies Committee, p.16)  
 
The committee further suggested that it would be inappropriate to include modern 
history in the curriculum of Anglo-Chinese Schools and Chinese Middle Schools:  
… the two sections, one on Modern Chinese History (A.D. 1644 –1945) and one 
on Modern World History (A.D. 1789 to present), both sections are 
predominantly political, and so not quite in line with the general principles which, 
in the opinion of the committee, should govern the study of history. (Ibid., pp. 
14-15) 
 
Following these recommendations, Chinese History curriculum developers 
changed the scope of study of the 1958 syllabus from A.D. 1644  (establishment of the 
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Qing dynasty) - 1945 (end of the Chinese civil war) to A.D. 960 (Song dynasty) – 1911 
(end of the Qing dynasty). The 1966 and 1967 riots in Hong Kong and their close 
connections with the Cultural Revolution in China reinforced curriculum developers’ 
determination to ensure that students did not study the Civil War (1945-49) or the early 
history of the PRC. Meanwhile, Hong Kong history was excluded from the curriculum. 
The primary focus was instead placed on the history of the Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan and 
Ming dynasties (A.D. 581-1643), which have been regarded by Chinese historians as 
the golden periods of Chinese cultural and imperial history. Chinese History was thus 
characterized by a process of depoliticization and decontextualization; its content 
bearing no relation to the contemporary mainland or local context.  
 In the 1950s and 1960s, the colonial government’s programme for depoliticising 
and decontextualising the school curriculum matched the interests of key players in the 
Chinese History subject community, in particular textbook writers and academics. For 
example, H.L. Law, F.L. Wong, T.S Pong, and K.T. Sun had all fled to Hong Kong 
after the Communist takeover in China in 1949. They were pro-KMT figures whose 
expertise was in ancient and medieval Chinese history, and as such they were 
sympathetic to a curriculum that de-emphasised contemporary history and excluded 
Hong Kong history. They regarded the teaching of Chinese History as a means of 
transplanting classical Chinese culture from the mainland to Hong Kong, thereby 
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nurturing a Chinese cultural identity. During the postwar period, both pro-KMT and 
pro-CCP members of the subject community deployed anti-colonial rhetoric as an 
instrument for promoting their respective interests. Pro-KMT members pressed for the 
establishment of a Chinese cultural identity (as the KMT was then doing in Taiwan) in 
order to maintain students’ sense of Chinese identity under British colonial rule; 
pro-CCP elements, meanwhile, strove to make sure that the Communist Party and the 
PRC were portrayed in a positive light, rather than being subjected to denigration by 
“imperialist” forces. At the same time, the principal curriculum developers considered 
that a thorough understanding of Chinese history required the teaching of the orthodox 
state-centred narrative chronologically and in its entirety, from the Xia dynasty (2100 
B.C.) to 1911 (end of the Qing dynasty). Their views were expressed in the following 
minutes: 
(i) The study of Chinese History requires considerable understanding and 
knowledge and the syllabus cannot be reduced. Besides, Chinese History should 
be studied with a sense of continuity and is quite different from European History, 
which can be studied as separate units. (ii) Chinese History as an independent 
subject in the HKCEE (which is not the usual practice in major countries) should 
be made as dignified as possible (iii) candidates will not be able to finish 
answering both conventional and multiple choice type questions if the time is 
reduced in the examination. (Minutes of meeting, Chinese History subject 
committee [Certificate of Education Examination (CEE)], 5 January, 1970) 
 
As a result, the curriculum involved exhaustive chronological coverage of the entire 
sweep of Chinese history, dynasty by dynasty, with assessments of the political and 
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cultural contribution of each to the greater glory of the Chinese nation. The intention 
was to promote students’ identification with an ancient cultural China, rather than with 
a modern Chinese state – whether Communist or Nationalist.  
Overall, during this period the Chinese History subject community was not an 
organized entity. Key curriculum developers were scholars exiled from the mainland 
and others who had grown up locally, most of whom taught in universities and schools. 
They influenced the Chinese History curriculum through writing textbooks, teaching, 
and participating in official curriculum committees. The way they defined Chinese 
historical knowledge and the subject’s mission coincided with the colonial 
administration’s goal of rendering the curriculum depoliticised and divorced from both 
the Hong Kong and contemporary Chinese contexts. 
GUARDIAN OF THE “CHINESE HISTORY SYSTEM”: 1974-97 
 From 1974 until the end of British rule in 1997, the Chinese History subject 
community continued to function as a loose association of individuals, rather than a 
formally organised group. Scholars, teachers and officials continued to express their 
views in the media, in particular in local newspapers. In this period, the focus of 
curricular aims shifted and curriculum developers assumed a more prominent and 
entrenched role as guardians of a now-established “Chinese History system”. Here the 
“Chinese History system” is taken to refer to the vision of Chinese History as an 
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indivisible whole, sacred and inviolable, that must be studied in its entirety to enable 
students to comprehend the cultural essence of China. This view had been influential 
during the first period (1950s – 74) but was further consolidated and reaffirmed in the 
mid-1970s, and persisted more or less unchallenged down to the end of British rule. On 
the basis of this principle, the subject community strove to maintain the existing 
curriculum in order to avoid any “contamination” of the subject that might threaten its 
independent status. Meanwhile, the role played by the subject community, and the way 
in which officials dealt with the Chinese History subject and its supporters, were 
closely related to the developing political context, which was characterised by a 
persistent weakness in the legitimacy of the British colonial administration, and later, in 
the run-up to Hong Kong’s retrocession, by pressures to realign the education system 
towards the promotion of a more politicised form of “patriotism” involving 
identification with the People’s Republic of China. 
 Compared with the previous period, the years from 1974 to 1997 witnessed 
relative political stability as émigrés from China in the early 1950s had settled down 
and a new generation born and brought up in Hong Kong had come to regard it as their 
homeland. Thus a stronger local identity began to take root. The colonial government 
was conscious of its low level of legitimacy, and therefore as long as serious political 
embarrassment for the government could be avoided, and in particular threats to its 
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relationship with the PRC minimised, the administration tended not to interfere with the 
activities of entrenched vested interest groups. As economic development proceeded 
and a middle class began to emerge, the government embarked on a large expansion of 
educational provision. Secondary schools in the 1970s increasingly needed to cater for 
a mass student clientele, rather than the narrower elite of previous decades, and 
therefore calls for curricular reforms arose, particularly among some government 
officials and university academics.  
In 1975, the government announced that it was to recommend the integration of 
Economic and Public Affairs, Geography, History, and Chinese History to form a new 
subject, Social Studies. This proposal was regarded by its advocates as an enlightened 
and progressive measure, and was inspired by similar “progressive” curricular 
innovations in the United States and elsewhere. However, the idea was greeted with 
outrage amongst the supporters of the Chinese History subject. The government was 
accused of trying to weaken Chinese “national sentiments” by integrating Chinese 
History into Social Studies instead of maintaining its independence. On 7 March 1975, 
the Chinese-language Oriental Daily newspaper devoted its entire front page to reports 
of protests against the colonial government’s intentions. Key curriculum developers 
such as university professors and union leaders expressed views such as the following:  
[This is a] conspiracy of the coloniser to carry out colonial education: this 
integration will weaken students’ Chinese awareness and national conception. 
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Social Studies aims to enhance students’ sense of belonging to Hong Kong, and 
this action is in itself incorrect. Being Hong Kong Chinese we should not only 
have Hong Kong in our mind. (K.T. Sun, Professor, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong and Chinese History textbook writer, 7 March 1975, Oriental Daily) 
 
The integration will add to the burden on teachers and students, [and] this is 
another form of colonial education. In weakening students’ knowledge of and 
sentimental attachment to China, the government aims to transform Chinese into 
Hongkongese.’ (Szeto Wah, Chairman, Professional Teachers Union, Ibid) 
 
The outcome of the dispute was that although the Social Studies subject was introduced, 
it was made optional (most schools did not choose to adopt it), and Chinese History was 
not included in the curriculum, and thus retained its total independence. More 
importantly, in 1975 the Curriculum Development Council (CDC) recommended that 
Chinese History become one of the subjects comprising the common-core curriculum3. 
The subject community’s strong antipathy towards the integration of Chinese History 
into Social Studies sent a message to the government: any attempt to reform the 
Chinese History curriculum could provoke vocal dissent, and in particular arouse 
nationalist and anti-colonial resentment.  
Thereafter, members of the subject community made use of a variety of channels 
to air their views. In the 1970s and 1980s, whenever Sino-Japanese disputes arose, for 
example over the sovereignty of Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, or the Nanjing Massacre, 
or narratives of the Pacific War in Japanese history textbooks, members of the subject 
community would routinely use these occasions to call for a strengthening of Chinese 
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History education and the cultivation of nationalism as a means of instilling in students 
a sense of the importance of national strength and solidarity in the face of (perceived) 
Japanese imperialism.. After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, 
it was also proposed that the scope of study should be extended to cover contemporary 
history, and that the role of Chinese  in patriotic education should be strengthened. As 
we shall see, in the run-up to and following the 1997 retrocession, the advocates of 
Chinese History did indeed increasingly seek to define their subject’s role as the 
standard bearer of patriotic education.  
 After the 1975 Social Studies fiasco, changes made to the Chinese History 
curriculum were minimal. The subject was henceforth defined as a sacred and 
inviolable realm within the school curriculum, and having repulsed the assault of the 
Social Studies reformists, Chinese History teachers and their supporters retreated once 
more into the impregnable fortress of “tradition”. Following their success in 
maintaining Chinese History’s independent status, curriculum developers issued a 
teaching syllabus for junior secondary Chinese History that aimed to encourage an 
identification with what was portrayed as an indivisible, immemorial and essentially 
unchanging indigenous culture: 
Chinese culture has a long history. … In five thousand years, the Chinese nation 
has produced great achievements in intellectual thinking and technology. 
Moreover, there are special characteristics in the way of life and social 
organization of the Chinese nation. Hence the first most important aim of teaching 
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Chinese History is to guide students to appreciate the long-existing Chinese 
cultural tradition and the characteristics of the way of life of the people. (Chinese 
History syllabus, S1-3, ED, 1975, p. 3) 
 
This syllabus marked the consolidation of the established “Chinese History system”, 
and a similar statement of aims was included in the S4 –5 syllabus. The 1975 syllabus 
extended the period of study from the Xia dynasty (2100 B.C.) to 1949. With the 
continuing exception of contemporary history, the entirety of Chinese history had to be 
studied, and the same applied to the syllabuses for S4-5 and S6-7. In other words, as 
during the previous period, Chinese History content was depoliticised and 
characterized by a focus on imperial deeds and personages (and the ‘correct’ 
apportionment of praise and blame in relation to such figures), as well as on cultural 
history.  
Notwithstanding the increasing strength of a distinctive local sense of identity 
during the 1970s and thereafter, the cultivation of local sentiment was never viewed as 
a legitimate or desirable aspiration on the part of the Chinese History subject 
community. For them, pan-Chinese nationalism was incomparably more important 
than what they saw as at best an ephemeral, or at worst a “mongrel” sense of local 
identity. Thus local history remained beyond the pale of Chinese History curricula 
throughout both the first and second periods discussed here. As a key Chinese History 
subject officer remarked:  
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We have to learn Chinese History. Each dynasty has its own characteristics. 
Students should, as far as possible, learn these characteristics before they can 
come to appreciate the greatness of China. Given that time is insufficient to study 
Chinese History, how could we include Hong Kong history in the curriculum?. 
(Interview, 4 August 1999)  
 
 There were major revisions to the curricula for most school subjects in the 
1980s and 1990s, including the History subject. Many of these reforms – or proposals 
for reform – resulted from concerns prompted by the shift from an elite towards a mass 
system of secondary education, and by social, cultural and political changes affecting 
Hong Kong more broadly. In the case of History, this period witnessed the introduction 
of data-based-questions, an increased emphasis on contemporary history, growing 
concerns over the use of English as a medium of instruction, and moves to introduce 
local history into the curriculum. However, Chinese History was effectively insulated 
from such broader trends. While this can largely be attributed simply to the extreme 
conservatism of the subject community, the nature of the bureaucratic system under 
British rule also played a part in protecting the subject’s key curriculum developers 
from pressure to change. According to the Head of the History Section: 
Although not all officers worked for money, the restrictions and bureaucratic 
culture obviously hindered the motivation of staff. Every now and then, feature 
articles relating to Chinese History appeared in the newspapers. The issues related 
to textbooks, examinations, and political factors. Once the issues were made 
known to the public, the senior officers, who were mostly British, would require a 
full English translation of the coverage of the incident. Under such circumstances, 
how could we work things through? Therefore, officers would try to avoid being 
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caught in any issues. And hence a mentality of ‘no work no fault’ was common 
amongst civil servants. (Interview, 9 August 1999) 
 
This view was echoed by the key Chinese History subject officer “… In a 
bureaucratic organization, one would not expect any great reward [for exercising 
initiative]. The most important thing was not to commit errors …” (Interview, 4 August 
1999). This helps to explain the minimal changes made to the Chinese History 
curriculum between 1974 and 1997.  
In the Chinese History subject committee, members were, in one way or another, 
associated with the subject officer. In an interview, this official recalled “I came to 
know these teachers through inspection, and I was sure that we held a common belief 
about Chinese History. That was why in the meeting never once did we have to vote for 
a decision. We all had a consensus …”. (Ibid.) In other words, the unchallenged reign 
of curricular orthodoxy was ensured in part through the co-opting onto the key 
committee of teachers who supported it. However, it was not merely the “packing” of 
the committee that ensured this conservative triumph. The relationships between 
academics, teachers and officials both within the committee and in the broader subject 
community outside it involved a web of teacher-student ties characterised by a culture 
of deference to seniority. During this period, the colonial government (having had its 
fingers burnt in 1975) adopted a laissez faire approach towards curriculum 
22 
development for Chinese History, leaving decision-making to the representatives of the 
subject community sitting on the Chinese History committee. Meanwhile, the PRC 
government by its very existence exerted pressure on the Chinese History subject 
community, although in a subtle and intangible manner. This was particularly the case 
after 1984 (the year of the Sino-British Joint Declaration), when Chinese History 
teachers and curriculum developers became aware that Hong Kong’s impending 
retrocession would present them both with a challenge to conform to the mainland 
regime’s interpretation of the past, and with an opportunity to enhance their status as 
the flag-bearers for “patriotic” values within the local education system. Under these 
circumstances, curriculum developers responsible for Chinese History, while striving 
to retain the existing curriculum and pedagogical style, continually regulated the 
subject’s scope of study in accordance with China’s political situation. Their object was 
to maintain the “Chinese History system” with as little alteration as possible, while 
protecting the subject from political criticism. The exclusion of post-1949 history from 
the curriculum until 1990 was largely a consequence of a desire to avoid adopting a 
potentially controversial position on events such as the Great Leap Forward or the 
Cultural Revolution, in the absence of any agreed “correct verdicts” on these episodes 
among official historians on the mainland. According to the key Chinese History 
subject officer: 
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Concerning the proposal for extension of the scope of studies to 1976, the major 
problem involved setting the marking scheme, in particular regarding the Cultural 
Revolution, when there were not yet any official views established in China. 
(Ibid.) 
Eventually, however, the end date of the syllabus was extended to 1976 in 1991 after 
the PRC authorities had adopted a consensus verdict on the Cultural Revolution: 
Many historians feel the syllabus can be extended to around 1976 because ‘the 
dust has settled’ for the period and reference books on the matter are easily 
available on the market. (South China Morning Post, 10 July 1989) 
 
Evidently, official interpretations of post-1949 events by the Beijing authorities have 
had a direct impact on the Chinese History curriculum in Hong Kong. However, the 
extent of this impact has been due to the collective willingness of members of the 
subject community to trim their sails to the prevailing winds from Beijing. They have 
themselves made sure that the curriculum does not provoke Beijing, rather than 
receiving direct or explicit instructions from the PRC to make amendments to 
curricular content.  
It should be noted that although the scope of the curriculum was in 1991 
extended to 1976, this did not necessarily involve any significant politicization of the 
curriculum, particularly since the discussion of alternative interpretations of historical 
events was not encouraged. Public examination questions relating to contemporary 
China were confined to factual narration, for example: “Generally describe the process 
of the Cultural Revolution from May 1966 to the end of 1968”(1997 CEE); and “Give a 
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full narration of the following events: the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural 
Revolution” (1997 A-level). Since these and other examination questions simply 
required the regurgitation of textbook narrative, which was itself studiously cautious in 
its interpretations of all controversial issues, the curriculum remained essentially 
decontextualized and depoliticized.  
A combination of bureaucratic inertia and political timidity (on the part of the 
colonial authorities) thus contributed to the effective insulation of Chinese History 
from pressures for change that were influencing other school subjects between the 
mid-1970s and 1997. Meanwhile, with the passing of time, the ultra-traditionalist 
orthodoxy enshrined in the curriculum during the 1950s and 1960s was imparted to 
successive generations of students and teachers as a sacred trust – their mission being to 
impart this in turn to scions of the Glorious Motherland as yet unborn. Finally, across 
the border in the Motherland itself, as the regime jettisoned socialism in favour of a 
revamped nationalism, the ideological position of the formerly hated Communists 
began to look more and more palatable to Hong Kong’s more traditionalist cultural 
patriots. It was this relationship with the mainland’s new nationalism that would shape 
the fate of Chinese History in the period following the 1997 retrocession. 
CHAMPION OF NATIONAL EDUCATION: 1997-2005 
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 In 1997, Hong Kong became a “Special Administrative Region” (SAR) of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The main difference between this period and the 
previous two is that the education reforms of 1999, which had at their core an attempt to 
integrate school subjects and thereby trim the school curriculum, prompted Chinese 
History teachers, academics and their supporters to organize themselves into two 
teacher associations to counteract the potential impact of these proposals on Chinese 
History. In order to enhance its status and protect its curricular territory, the subject 
community has increasingly sought to link Chinese History education with the 
programmes for national (or “patriotic”) education through which the post-1997 
administration has sought to foster a heightened consciousness of national identity 
among Hong Kong’s population.  
Before the handover, curriculum developers had already begun preparations for a 
revision of the curriculum to meet the requirements of the new political dispensation. 
The changes made to the S1-3 Chinese History curriculum accurately reflected the 
priorities and sensitivities of the new SAR government and its Beijing backers. For 
example, the revised curriculum stressed the importance of arousing national identity 
through the study of Chinese History, inserting into the curricular guidelines the aim of 
“cultivating a sense of belonging to the nation and its people” (S1-3 Chinese History 
syllabus, CDC, 1997, p.8). Secondly, Hong Kong history was for the first time included 
26 
in the syllabus, a measure aimed at “enhancing students’ interest in studying this 
subject, and establishing local and national sentiments” (S1-3 Chinese History syllabus, 
CDC, 1997, p.8). However, this was largely a symbolic move, since local history was 
confined to an optional “appendix” to the main course. This contrasted starkly with the 
treatment of local history in the History subject, where it was integrated as a core 
component of the curriculum. Indeed, the preparation of the local history “appendix” to 
the Chinese History syllabus can be seen as a reaction to its introduction into the 
History curriculum, and a symbolic assertion of Hong Kong’s “Chineseness”. These 
Chinese History teaching materials portrayed Hong Kong merely as a sideshow to the 
main drama of the national past, ignoring the recent development of a distinctive local 
identity, and from the opening paragraphs of the narrative ramming home the message 
that Hong Kong “has been a part of China since time immemorial”. (CDI, Teaching 
Materials for Local History, issued as an Appendix to the Junior Secondary Chinese 
History syllabus, 1997; see also the discussion of this in Vickers, 2005, Chapter 7.)  
In the first few years after the handover, the subject community remained as 
disorganized and ad hoc as it had been in previous periods, with members expressing 
their views in the media either through broad-based teaching unions or individually. 
Meanwhile, the Chief Executive, C.H. Tung, in his policy addresses repeatedly called 
for the promotion of Chinese studies in Hong Kong. In his 1997 inaugural address he 
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declared: “We will incorporate the teaching of Chinese values in the school curriculum 
and provide more opportunities for students to learn about Chinese history and culture. 
This will foster a stronger sense of Chinese identity in our students” (Policy Address, 8 
October 1997). Such statements appeared to indicate strong official backing for the 
Chinese History subject, and to promise an enhancement of its role and status within 
the school curriculum. 
However, in 1999 the SAR government, apparently feeling that its 
Beijing-bestowed mandate gave it greater authority and leverage over education policy 
than its colonial predecessor, announced sweeping educational reforms. The proposals 
included a recommendation to merge the separate subjects of History and Chinese 
History to form a subject provisionally called “New History”. At the same time, the 
CDI proposed the introduction of eight “Key Learning Areas” (KLA). Chinese History 
along with History was included within the KLA of  “Personal, Social and Humanities 
Education” (PSHE).  
In the event, this “New History” episode turned out to be just one of many 
instances since 1997 in which agencies of the SAR government have fallen foul of 
contradictions bedeviling the administration’s agenda. With respect to education, the 
key contradiction affecting Chinese History has been between the priority accorded to 
the promotion of “patriotic education” on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
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importance attached to fostering “critical thinking” and analytical skills (seen as crucial 
to Hong Kong’s successful engagement with the global “knowledge economy”). Many 
of those reformers within and outside the educational bureaucracy who have focused on 
the latter priority have long aspired to take an axe to Chinese History, which they see as 
a redoubt of hidebound teaching methods and excessive content, forcing students to 
memorise dry facts without affording them any opportunities to exercise their own 
critical judgement. There is little doubt that in 1999, reformers within the ED hoped 
that a comprehensive shake-up of the entire education system would provide them with 
an opportunity to instigate an overhaul of history education that would at last begin to 
undermine the foundations of the Chinese History fortress.   
However, predictably enough this proposal provoked a reaction on the part of the 
subject community similar to that witnessed in 1975, in response to the proposal to 
incorporate Chinese History within an integrated Social Studies curriculum. In 1999, 
Chinese History educators organised themselves into two subject associations: the 
Hong Kong Teachers’ Association of Chinese History Education (zhong guo li shi jiao 
yu xue hui) and the Chinese History Educators’ Society (zhong guo li shi jiao shi hui ). 
These two teachers’ associations presented themselves as pressure groups and in their 
mission statements specified, in the words of one of them, the need “to take into close 
concern and respond to [sic] those socio-political events that relate to Chinese history 
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education” (Founding ceremony of the Chinese History Educators’ Society, 7 July 
2000). At the same time, both associations openly sought to wrap themselves in the 
mantle of patriotic education:  
 … after the handover, Hong Kong people have to accept their Chinese identity. 
Our students have to study Chinese history in order to enable them to understand 
our own past, our own identity and our own role. This understanding can help us 
to take up the responsibility of being Chinese so that we can do our best to 
contribute to our nation. As teachers, we do not have to hide our feelings and 
passion as we did during the colonial period. Chinese History has a special 
mission: to nurture stuents’ national feelings and patriotism …. (P.W. Leung, 
Chairman, Chinese History Educators’ Society, Ibid.)  
 
Both associations have publicised teachers’ concerns in the media and on websites, 
and pressed key government officials to take a close interest in the subject. When major 
press editorials took sides with the subject community, the SAR government was 
placed in an embarrassing situation: 
Chinese History should be strengthened not weakened. (Editorial, Ming Pao, 7 
April 2000) 
 
Education Department merges the two histories and is bombarded for ignoring 
national sentiments. (Editorial, Oriental Daily, 8 April 2000) 
 
The Education Department has evil intention in merging the two histories. 
(Editorial, The Sun, 23 April 2000) 
 
Several weeks later, a top-ranking Beijing official, Chen Zhili, also implicitly 
allied herself with the subject community:  
Chinese History is part of world history but as Chinese, we should learn Chinese 
History thoroughly. The subject should be introduced to students in a very 
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comprehensive and scientific way. There needs to be more academic discussion 
on whether it should be merged into world history as a small part. (Sunday 
Morning Post, 28 May 2000) 
 
K.F. Fung, vice-chairman of the Chinese History Educators’ Society, in his article 
The Way Forward for Chinese History points out that in order to solicit support from 
different parties, the association’s tactic is to meet influential key players directly and 
ask for their support in fighting for an independent Chinese History curriculum. The list 
has included representatives of the Office of the Chief Executive, HKSAR, the Central 
Liaison Office (Beijing's headquarters in Hong Kong), the Curriculum Development 
Institute, and various political parties. (Fung, 2003, p. 160)  
In this period, the SAR government and curriculum reformers found themselves 
under enormous pressure because of the views expressed by senior Beijing officials as 
well as the strategy adopted by the subject community, which effectively accused the 
local authorities of betraying the patriotic cause. As a result, “New History” was quietly 
shelved in 2002 after the completion of a pilot scheme. The political sensitivity 
surrounding Chinese History, and in particular the government’s sensitivity to any 
accusations of a deficiency of “patriotic” fervour among its officials, meant that it was 
felt to be necessary to appease the subject community.  
Since the handover, the Chinese History subject community has further solidified 
its power, and has become more organized in defending its role as the standard bearer 
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for national education, thus counteracting any curriculum reforms that might threaten 
either the status or the inviolable essence of the subject. Hence, representatives of the 
two teacher associations took part in the revision of the S4-5 Chinese History 
curriculum which was introduced in 2003. This revised curriculum reflected a 
comprehensive and enthusiastic embrace of “patriotism” as the guiding principle of 
Chinese History education and was the product of a struggle between the subject 
community and leading officials within the EMB and HKEAA, testifies to the power 
wielded by the supporters of the Chinese History subject: whereas the original proposal 
put forward by the EMB and HKEAA envisaged sweeping changes (including a focus 
on the modern and contemporary period, and options on the history of Hong Kong and 
Taiwan), the revised curriculum stressed the inheritance of Chinese culture, expanded 
the chronological scope of study from the Zhou dynasty (~1100 BC) to the end of the 
20th century, and laid particular emphasis on Chinese History’s role in promoting 
national identity (Chinese History Curriculum and Assessment Guide, S4-5, CDC & 
HKEAA, 2003). In general, therefore, it would appear that the subject community had 
yet again ensured that in Chinese History plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose, 
though it should be noted that the new curriculum also includes a nod towards the 
importance of promoting students’ critical thinking skills, and the guidelines devote 
considerable space to an introduction of the inquiry approach in learning and 
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assessment. However, as seen from the sample questions prepared by the HKEAA, 
inquiry questions and data-based questions were not included. The difference in 
requirement between this new curriculum and the previous ones was that students were 
given room to express their views. 
CONCLUSION 
 The colonial government’s impact on the Chinese History curriculum was 
direct and powerful in the first period, gradually becoming more indirect and nominal 
in the second period. As long as the boat was sailing peacefully, the colonial 
government did not subsequently interfere in the curricula for the Chinese cultural 
subjects. We have previously argued that Hong Kong’s Chinese History curriculum 
was a product of collaborative colonialism between the Chinese History subject 
community and the colonial authorities (Vickers, Kan and Morris, 2003). Hunter’s 
(1995) concept of a “local community elite” is relevant here. According to Hunter, the 
“local community elite” can exert enormous influence on policy making, and wields its 
power backstage: 
The front stage of local community elites are often the very basis and substance of 
their power, for the power structure is often directly reflected in the steel and glass 
buildings and impressed in the concrete of the physical development of the local 
community … Although the public frontstage may reflect the power of local elites, 
it is in the backstage where the power itself is most often wielded. The backstages 
of elites are carefully guarded from public view, and they have the power to 
protect them. (1995, pp. 153-54) 
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Since most of those responsible for the development of the Chinese History curriculum 
(particularly the senior academics and officials who dominate curriculum committees 
and vet textbooks), play their role backstage, they are rarely held accountable for 
Chinese History’s conservative, rote learning-oriented curriculum. On the contrary, 
students’ lack of critical thinking skills and their weak sense of national sentiment have 
been seen as products of the colonial government’s deliberate efforts to nurture a group 
of submissive and unintelligent students who were detached from their motherland. 
The media, and those critical of the Chinese History subject within academia, the 
teaching profession and the educational bureaucracy itself, have seldom expressed their 
opinions publicly, largely for fear of being branded “unpatriotic” or “colonialist” by 
supporters of Chinese History.  
We have pointed out that this local community elite, when it appeared at “front 
stage”, whether to assume the role of guardian of Chinese culture, defend the “Chinese 
History system”, or wrap itself in the mantle of “national education”, was not simply 
following an agenda dictated by the colonial or SAR authorities, but was in one way or 
another pursuing its own interests and acting according to its own beliefs. In fact, the 
role of the colonial government in all this was largely restricted to opening up space 
within the school curriculum for Chinese History teachers and curriculum developers to 
occupy. Once they were in residence, subsequent attempts on the part of government 
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officials to evict them, or even to renegotiate the terms of their tenancy, were 
successfully rebuffed. Thus we argue that it is primarily because of the dogged 
territoriality and doctrinaire traditionalism of this subject community that the 
curriculum for Chinese History has remained largely unchanged for more than 50 years. 
And this has resulted in a focus on content knowledge centring on imperial court 
personages and their deeds, and a chronological approach in which the exhaustive study 
of an orthodox narrative of China’s past is deemed essential. That a largely closely 
related and self-perpetuating elite within the subject community were able to define 
Chinese History’s nature and scope and maintain this status quo for 50 years can be 
attributed to a culture of deference towards bureaucrats and university academics in the 
subject committees, and the unwillingness of successive administrations to pursue 
reform in the face of allegations of neo-colonialism or lack of patriotism. 
As a result, a cobwebbed orthodoxy has been successfully defended over the past 
fifty years, whereby the same curricular content (covered at different levels of detail) 
has been offered to students at the levels of S1-3, S4-5, and S6-7. A remarkable degree 
of consensus within the Chinese History subject community over aims and content has 
underpinned solidarity in defence of Chinese History’s status as an independent school 
subject, and a “core” component of the school curriculum as a whole. The pattern 
observed here appears to differ from Goodson's portrayal of subject communities in the 
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UK, which he sees as typically characterised by power struggles between rival 
members of the subject community. In the case of Chinese History, challenges to the 
authority of senior academics and officials have seldom been witnessed. At the same 
time, the Chinese History subject community’s interference in curriculum policy 
making has been unique among school subjects in Hong Kong, where the absence of 
influential intermediate groups, such as teacher associations, in Hong Kong has in 
general led to a marked weakness of subject communities vis-à-vis the government 




1 In 2003 the government plans to set up basic criteria for prospective teachers, such as 
a university degree plus a teacher’s certificate.  
 
2 The HKEA is a quasi-autonomous government organization, responsible for 
administering public examinations. 
 
3 Peiping was the name given to Beijing by the Nationalist Government, which had 
made Nanjing the national capital.. The name Beijing was reinstated after the 
establishment of PRC moved the capital back there in 1949. 
 
4 The common-core subjects include Chinese History, Chinese language, English 
language, Mathematics, Science, Social Studies, Art and Design, Ethics/Religious 
















A comparison of the current two history subjects in Hong Kong 
(Junior level and CEE) 
 
Features History  Chinese History 
 1995 Secondary 1-3 
curriculum guide 
1997 Secondary 1-3 curriculum guide 
Chronological 
scope 
Ancient period ~3000 BC to 20th 
Century 
Ancient period ~ 2100 BC to 1970s 
Geographical 
scope 
Ancient and medieval Europe, two 
world wars, Hong Kong 
History of China 
2003 Secondary 4-5 curriculum guide  
(first examined in 2006) 
Chronological 
scope 
Focus on the 20th Century ~1100BC (Zhou dynasty) to end of the 20th 
Century, though aiming at ‘detailing contemporary 
history while de-emphasizing ancient history’ 
Geographical 
scope 
? Asia ( HKSAR, China, 
Japan and Southeast Asia) 
? 20th Century world (the two 
world wars, international 
cooperations) 
History of China 
View of history A critical discipline (at least in 
theory).  Historical truth is not 
absolute – different, equally valid 
interpretations are possible. 
The official syllabus stipulates ‘the development of 
students’ analytical ability and objective attitude’, 
but in practice embodies a single, orthodox view.  
 
Moral agenda no overtly moralising tone in the 
intended curriculum and exam 
questions. 
? the subject is explicitly seen as a moralising 
agent.   
? teaching good conduct through the study of 
certain historical figures is a key aim 
? at the junior level, a prescribed set of values is 
laid down under each topic. 
Role/ function Shift over the past two or three 
decades : 
? from simple objective of 
understanding the past 
? to a more complex and 
ambitious set of objectives 
such as ‘critical thinking 
skills’, ‘sceptical’ attitude 
towards sources, and 
‘civic-related’ aims geared 
towards enabling students’ 
to exercise their rights as 
citizens of an increasingly 
liberal, democratic polity. 
Considerable differences before and after the 
handover of sovereignty in 1997: 
? from ‘knowing’, ‘understanding’ and 
‘analysing’ the traditional Chinese culture, 
dynastic history, and behavioural modelling 
of certain historical figures  
? to an explicit development of a sense of 
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